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Introduction 
 
Being from Las Vegas, Nevada, I enjoy a wide variety of unique activities 
and opportunities. The obvious and most famous of these are driving down Las 
Vegas Boulevard and looking at the neon world that is my home, losing money in 
casinos searching for riches that are never promised, and the occasional run-in with 
Elvis Presley. In addition to the exciting entertainment that exists within Sin City, 
I also enjoy something that one probably would not think of when imagining this 
desert city: a variety of local, healthy news outlets. 
In Southern Nevada, three newspapers are headquartered in Las Vegas. We 
have the center-left Las Vegas Sun, the center-right Las Vegas Review Journal, and 
the non-partisan, but often credited with being left-leaning, The Nevada 
Independent. All these newspapers provide news coverage on issues that range 
from county-specific events to occurrences on the national and international stage. 
This may not seem like a significant fact, and many would probably expect many 
different sources of information, yet that is not the case in many places. 
In many places around the country, there is little to no local news coverage. 
In the 1900s, local newspapers were among the most vital sources of information, 
and local news outlets provided citizens in their areas with the lowdown of weather, 
current events, and political information. As time went on, however, local news has 
dwindled to historic lows. 
Simultaneously, the political tension in the United States has steadily 
increased to historic highs not seen since the Civil War. The tension can be felt on 
the street and on social media, leading to divisions among the public. The recent 
2020 protests around the topic of police brutality and the extreme discourse around 
the results of the 2020 presidential election that led to the January 6
th
 insurrection 
at the United States Capitol Building are just two instances where the ideological 
schism in our country can be observed. 
In addition to the public's perception of division, we have also seen 
increased polarization with political elites. The partisanship in Washington D.C. 
has increased steadily from the middle of the 20th century to a point where 
bipartisanship is nearly impossible. Ideological camps in both the Democratic and 
Republican parties have begun waging cultural and philosophic war. This has led 
to a decrease in efficient governing and a loss of trust in the political system by 
many Americans. 
In this article, I will analyze the interaction that local news and polarization 
have on one another. I argue that the country's discourse has profound implications 
on politics, and the most popular way that discourse reaches the public affects 
political views. I will argue that as local news declines, polarization will increase. 
In the following sections, I will discuss some of the root causes of polarization and 
the decline of local news. I will then conduct a data analysis to determine if these 




Issues that come onto the radar for lawmakers in the U.S. are captured by 
the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, where policy preferences are 
created and peddled. Problems arise when both the constituents and the lawmakers 
themselves create opinions and form proposals along strict party lines. This has 
occurred in the American political system, leading to high political polarization that 
is collapsing the ideological center. 
Political polarization constitutes a threat to the health of the political system. 
It forces voters and legislators to align themselves together in opposition to 
legislation across all issues and severely diminishes the likelihood of bipartisan 
compromises being made. This, in turn, crystallizes interests into opposing factions 
(Baldassarri, Gelman 2008), further compounding the issue of gridlock that is 
inherent in democratic institutions such as those built into the framework of the 
Constitution. Polarization in the U.S. is characterized by adherence to radical 
ideology at both ends of the political spectrum. 
 
Ideological Sorting 
Americans have never agreed on political matters, and as far back as the 
nation's founding, these disagreements have been hashed out in ideological battles. 
As our political system reached maturity, the two-party system became dominant 
and allowed individuals to understand how elected officials and candidates would 
make decisions partially. Differing from today, the two parties were much more 
like one another for a long time, with both including liberal and conservative 
outlooks on policy preferences. In the 1960s, Clinton Rossiter, a political scientist, 
and historian claimed that "[T]here is and can be no real difference between the 
Democrats and the Republicans, because the unwritten laws of American politics 
demand that the parties overlap substantially in principle, policy, character, appeal, 
and purpose—or cease to be parties with any hope of winning a national election," 
(Fiorina 2016). 
This began to change as parties started forming policy attitudes that directly 
countered one another. The Democratic Party grew into the party of liberalism and 
the Republican Party into the party of conservatism. From the last few decades in 
the twentieth century to today, the political parties have become better sorted on 
moral and cultural issues (Fiorina, Abrams 2008). Voters have since seen these 
parties as vectors of political change that can stand on one side or the other of their 
views, effectively solidifying them in their support of their chosen side. This has 
been called ideological sorting and occurs when voters move to parties that share 
similar outlooks, making them more entrenched in their preferences and less likely 
to deviate from adherence to their party. 
This sorting of parties has had many effects. We have seen the distance 
between parties and their ideology, but also less difference within them 
(Hetherington 2009). This has led to the prevalence of party-line votes, where a 
majority of one party opposes a majority from the other, in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. Since the 1970s, there has been a 30% increase in 
the party unity score, and in 2015 was sitting at 90% (Dancey, Sheagley 2017). This 
demonstrates how ideological sorting has polarized the parties' elites, leading to the 
next major driver of polarization. 
 
Negative Partisanship & Top-Down Polarization 
As mentioned above, the parties have become more ideologically 
homogenous. This has led elites within the parties to move to more extreme 
ideological poles. There were points where both the Republicans and Democrats 
had overlapping preferences, but today there is little to no preference overlap 
between them (Banda, Cluverius 2018). This can be seen with the increased 
prominence of strict party-line voting, which has increased in recent decades. 
The polarization of the elites is partly due to the negative partisanship that 
has become a norm in governance. Negative partisanship occurs when political 
preferences are formed not in favor of a particular political group or policy outlook 
but in opposition to another group. Today, larger swaths of Republicans and 
Democrats hold strongly negative views of the opposing party than in the past 
(Abramowits, Webster 2015). These negative views make their way into the 
legislative process, and we have seen an increase in strict party-line voting that 
highlights how negative partisanship can affect bipartisan legislating. 
Due to the increased polarization among political elites, the American 
electorate has also become more polarized. This is a top-down process, where the 
polarization occurs strongest among the high-ranking politicians who receive mass 
media attention nationwide. Today, partisan media sources allow citizens to match 
their news consumption to fit their ideological preferences (Levendusky 2013). 
Partisan media amplifies the messages disseminated from both political poles and 
puts the opinions and actions of political elites on display. With the focus on hyper- 
polarized elites, Americans are flooded with arguments from the polarized political 
elite. 
Because these politicians appear on the air at no extra cost, they have 
effectively become part of the journalistic machine used to draw in audiences and 
act as sources for information (Ben-Porath 2007). Elite polarization amplifies 
partisan-motivated reasoning (Robinson, Mullinix 2016), which explains why even 
in everyday life, the effects of political polarization can be felt. 
 
The Decline of Local News 
 
Local news has long been the medium of information that connected people 
with their neighbors and important events in their areas. In addition to providing 
information about developments in their communities, local news plays a vital role 
in driving civic engagement and allowing citizens to hold their elected officials 
accountable (Martin, McCrain 2019). According to Penelope Abernathy and the 
UNC's Center for Innovation and Sustainability in Local Media, between 2004 and 
2014, 664 of the 8,591 local newspapers had vanished (2016). With the prominence 
of local news at its lowest levels in U.S. history, this has had implications for the 
knowledge citizens have surrounding politics, shaping their ideological and 
engagement in the political world. 
 
The Internet's Role 
The prominence of the internet has led to a decline in the news and 
journalism industry. As more readers migrated from traditional means of news 
consumption toward new online news outlets, advertisers and investors moved 
away from these seemingly antiquated forms of dissemination. The migration to 
online outlets has led to a decline in one of the main sources of income for 
newspapers: ad revenue. Between 2008 and 2018, there was a 68% drop in ad 
revenue across the newspaper industry (Hendrickson 2019). 
The preference for online news sources is partly due to the ease with which 
the general public can access the internet at home and on the go. According to Pew 
Research's Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, as of 2019, 90% of adults in the United 
States use the internet, with 73% of them having broadband internet services in 
their homes (2019). Because many of the news sources on the internet are free of 
cost, consumers become accustomed to using the internet to obtain information 
without a subscription price (Payne 2011). The increased access to the internet, 
coupled with free access to information, has allowed online-based news outlets to 
thrive. In contrast, local news outlets that have typically been the medium of choice 
have declined severely. 
 
Media Concentration 
In the United States, media ownership has slowly been amassed by a small 
number of corporations. From 1984 to 2005, the mass media industry held by the 
top 10 media firms went from 17.7% to 35.5% (Vizcarrondo 2013). The 2000s was 
a period where local news outlets struggled to gain a footing in the changing 
environment. Many of these outlets were purchased by investment groups, and 
today, seven of the largest 25 newspaper owners are investment groups (Abernathy 
2016). As large media conglomerates take over smaller news outlets, we see two 
main patterns emerge. 
First, the news shown has less to do with the occurrences in the local area 
and more to do with national news. This problem has implications for many aspects 
of daily life, but it has specific effects on political knowledge. Most of the 
information put forward to the public about political candidates comes from local 
print newspapers (Hayes, Lawless 2018). When this medium is focused on 
increasingly national news due to media conglomerations dictating the topics, local 
populations receive less information about politics in their area. 
Second, with large takeovers by corporations, the news that acquired outlets 
report becomes partisan. One such example comes by analyzing the stations 
acquired by the Sinclair Broadcast Group that owns over 290 stations. As Sinclair 
has bought these outlets, there has been a rightward partisan shift in content that 
can be expected to have consequences for election outcomes and polarization 
(Martin, McCrain 2019). This ideological shift in news coverage reflects the 
political views of Sinclair, which can alter the narratives presented in the media. 
The decline in local media due to media concentration has led the news in 









With the current trends of increased polarization and the decline of local 
news, it appears that they are linked in some way. I hypothesize that as local news 
declines, polarization increases. 
 
Methods Overview 
In order to complete this study, Pew Research Center's Newspaper Fact 
Sheet (July 9, 2019) was utilized. Pew compiled data on the state of newspapers in 
the United States from 1940 to 2018 that includes: unique visitors of newspaper 
websites, visit duration of newspaper websites, estimated advertising, circulation 
revenue of the newspaper industry, the share of newspaper advertising revenue 
coming from digital advertising, employment in newspaper newsrooms and total 
estimated circulation of U.S. daily newspapers. For this research, the total estimated 
circulation of U.S. newspapers was used as a proxy for the prevalence of local news 
organizations over time. Pew collected this information from the News Media 
Alliance (NMA), a trade association representing newspapers in the United States 
and Canada. NWA represents large daily newspapers as well as hyperlocal news 
sources (News Media Alliance). Their calculations of estimated circulation include 
print and digital, including both weekly newspapers and Sunday-specific 
newspapers. The data I used in this research includes the number of weekly and 
Sunday newspapers in circulation from 1951 to 2017. In the data, the number of 
weekly newspapers in circulation is coded as (weekly_million) and the and Sunday 
papers as (sunday_million), which are the independent variables. These millions of 
newspapers are used to measure both variables. 
Throughout the 66 years observed, the data shows a decline in the number 
of newspapers in circulation. This begins at the end of the 1980s and continues to 
decline further as time goes on. The most weekly newspapers in circulation of any 
year were in 1973, when 63.15 million were circulated. The year with the least 
number of weekly newspapers in circulation was in 2017, when 30.95 million were 
circulated. The average number of weekly newspapers in circulation during the 
elapsed time was 56.20 million. 
A similar trend is occurring for the Sunday newspapers, but the decline 
begins in the early 1990s. The most Sunday newspapers in circulation were in the 
year 1993, when 62.57 million were in circulation. The year with the least amount 
of Sunday papers was in 2017 with 33.97 million in circulation. The average 




Graph 1. Newspaper circulation over time. 
 
 
To measure polarization, I used Voteview's NOMINATE scores were used. 
Voteview is a project that was created in the late 1980s and early 1990s by political 
scientists Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal at Carnegie-Mellon University to 
follow every congressional roll call vote in American History (Voteview). The 
project tracks votes in both the House of Representatives and the Senate through 
time, analyzes them, and assigns each congress a polarization score.  
 
Graph 2. Polarization score over time 
Data from the 82nd Congress of 1951 to the 115th Congress of 2017 
illustrates polarization in the United States. The closer the score is to 1, the more 
polarized the congress is, and the closer to –1 the number is, the closer the congress 
is to being void of polarization completely. These scores are given to each congress 
that was measured, and it follows that these scores were given every two years at 
the conclusion of the congress. 
Although data for both the House and Senate were available, the House was 
chosen as the House is made up of more members, reflecting more accurately the 
preferences of the American people. In my data, the polarization score is coded as 
(polar_score) and is the dependent variable. 
During 1951 - 2017, there is an increase in polarization in the House of 
Representatives. The House was least polarized during the 83rd Congress of 1953 
with a polarization score of .53. It was most polarized during the most recent 115th 
Congress of 2017, with a polarization score of .88. The average polarization score 
over the measured period is .67. 
In addition to the polarization score, I inputted the President's political party 
for each year that has a score. This was done to see if the President's political 
affiliation affected the polarization score of the congresses. This is a binary control 
variable that I have added, and it is coded as (party). A Democratic President is 
represented as a 1, and a Republican President is represented as a 0. 
 
 
























































To test my hypothesis, I ran two linear regressions; one for the effect that 
weekly newspapers have on polarization scores and one for the effect that Sunday 
newspapers have on polarization. I included the President's political party in office 





































All models estimated using regression. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
  
The circulation of weekly newspapers is very statically impactful. The 
effect of weekly newspapers on the polarization score is negative, meaning as the 
number of weekly newspapers in circulation decreases, the polarization score 
increases. The effect of weekly newspaper circulation is significant at the 0.05 
level. As the number of weekly newspapers in circulation declines by 1 million, 
there is a 0.011 increase in the polarization score. 
When I tested the effect of the circulation of Sunday newspapers, there was 
a much less impactful outcome. The circulation of Sunday newspapers was 
positive, meaning that as the number of Sunday newspapers decreases, there is a 
decrease in the polarization score. However, this figure is insignificant as it has a P 
value of 0.911, placing it out of the 0.05 significance level. 
The difference in the effects of the weekly and Sunday newspapers in 
circulation makes sense and was expected. The number of weekly newspapers in 
circulation has remained much higher than that of the Sunday papers, showing that 
they have been less prominent. It follows that it has less of an impact on 
polarization. 
The political party of the President in office during the congresses that were 
measured was included as a control variable in the regression in Table 1 for weekly 
newspaper circulation as well as in the regression in Table 2 for Sunday newspaper 
circulation. In both regressions, the political party of the President had no statistical 
significance. For weekly newspapers, the control had a P value of 0.979, making it 
statistically insignificant at the 0.05 level. When ran with the Sunday newspapers, 
the P-value of the control was 0.420, again deeming it statistically insignificant at 
the 0.05 level. 
My analysis of the regressions supports my hypothesis; as local media 
declines, polarization increases. This can be seen with the data provided in Table 1 
and discussed earlier. As the number of weekly newspapers in circulation decreases, 
polarization increases. 
Sunday newspapers have no statistical significance, as mentioned above, 
but they are not the most common method of newspaper distribution and therefore 
have more negligible effect on the polarization score. Because the control variable 
was insignificant in both regressions, it shows that it does not matter which party is 





In this article, I aimed to analyze how the decline of local news affected 
polarization in the United States. The results of the statistical analysis provide 
evidence in favor of my hypothesis that as the decline of local news increased, so 
has polarization. 
In the U.S., there has been a significant decline in the number of newspapers 
in circulation, a proxy that I used to estimate the health of local news outlets. The 
data collected from Pew Research showcased how the circulation of both weekly 
and Sunday newspapers has been in decline for several decades. Simultaneously, 
the Voteview's polarization score used to measure the change in polarization among 
Congress over time also increased. At first glance, it looked as if these two were 
correlated. My analysis of the data later confirmed this. 
The decline of local news had a casual effect on the polarization scores that 
were given. I added in the control variable of the President's political party during 
each Congress that was given a polarization score to see if there was any connection 
between which party held control over the federal government and the amount of 
polarization. There was no connection, showing that it was irrelevant which party 
held power. 
This research is important because it is imperative to look at the relationship 
between our media systems and our political system. Today there is a high level of 
polarization that does not seem to be going anywhere, and the decline of local news 
is a crucial factor in further polarization. If the United States wants to combat this 
issue, an in-depth understanding of how our information distribution system works 
must be attained. This article is only a portion of the overall research that needs to 
be conducted to achieve that goal. 
My research is limited in a couple of ways. There are more variables that I 
believe contribute to the polarization of the congress that should be analyzed. My 
control variable was needed to observe how control over the executive branch 
affects polarization. However, the government is more intricately connected, and it 
may be helpful to collect and analyze data on which party held the majority in each 
of the congresses measured. In addition, although the data used to represent the 
decline of local news was relatively representative, there are better data sets that 
could be used to measure the connection. One such dataset is the one included in 
the UNC's Center for Innovation & Sustainability in Local Media's The Rise of a 
New Media Baron and the Emerging Threat of News Deserts. This dataset might 
showcase a more accurate decline of local news. I attempted to attain the metadata 
for my research but was unable to gain access to it. 
With the continued decline of local news, more research must be done on 
how this will affect our democracy in the future. Future research should investigate 
how the decline of local news has accelerated in recent years and how to combat 
that issue. Also, it is imperative that research examines how polarized democracies 
create policy and what effect polarization has on trust in government. As 
polarization steadily increases, the country runs many risks, one of which I believe 
could be a legitimacy crisis that would further hinder the ability to govern the 
population effectively. 
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